From: ALLEN, Sarah J [mailto:Sarah.ALLEN@nats.co.uk]
On Behalf Of NATS Safeguarding
Sent: 11 August 2014 09:02
To: Brace, Carl
Subject: Your Ref: P142059/F (Our Ref: SG19482)

We refer to the application above. The proposed development has been examined by our technical and operational safeguarding teams. Although the proposed development is likely to impact our electronic infrastructure, NATS (En Route) plc has <u>no safeguarding objection</u> to the proposal.

Details of the NERL assessment are outlined in the attached report TOPA SG19482.

Please be aware that this response applies specifically to the above consultation and only reflects the position of NATS (En Route) plc, that is responsible for the management of en-route air traffic. The response is based on the information supplied at the time of application and does <u>not</u> provide any indication of the position of other parties such as airports, airspace users or other consultees. It remains your responsibility to ensure that all the relevant stakeholders have been consulted.

If any changes to the proposal are made subsequent to this letter, as a statutory consultee, NATS requires that it be consulted again on the changes, in advance of any planning permission being granted.

Should you have any queries regarding this matter you can contact us on details stated below.

Yours faithfully

#### Sarah Allen

**NATS Safeguarding** 

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# **Technical and Operational Assessment (TOPA)**

For Halfridge Farm Windfarm Development

Issue 1

NATS reference: SG19482

LPA reference: P142059/F

#### **Publication history**

Issue	Month/Year	Changes in this issue
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### 1. Background

#### **1.1.En-route Consultation**

NATS is responsible for the safe and expeditious movement in the en-route phase of flight for aircraft operating in controlled airspace in the UK. To undertake this responsibility it has a comprehensive infrastructure of radars, communication systems and navigational aids throughout the UK, all of which could be compromised by the establishment of a wind farm.

In this respect NATS is responsible for safeguarding this infrastructure to ensure its integrity to provide the required services to Air Traffic Control (ATC).

In order to discharge this responsibility <u>NATS is a statutory consultee for all</u> <u>wind farm applications</u>, and assesses the potential impact of every proposed development in the UK.

The En-route radar technical assessment section of this document defines the assessments carried out against the development proposed in section 2.

### 2. Application details

Herefordshire Council submitted a request for a NATS technical and operational assessment (TOPA) for the development at Halfridge Farm, Pippins Hill, Acton Beauchamp, Worcester as detailed in the table below.

Turbine	Latitude	Longitude	Easting	Northing	Hub Height (m)	Tip Height (m)
1	52.1500	-2.4572	368817	250292	50	77

Table 1 – turbine coordinates and height

### **3. Assessments Required**

The proposed development falls within the assessment area of the following systems:

NERL Radar Sites	Latitude	Longitude	Range(nm)	Range(km)	Azimuth(deg)	Туре
Burrington Radar						
(cmb)	50.9343	-3.9854	92.8	171.8	37.5	CMB
Claxby Radar	53.4501	-0.3083	110.6	204.8	225.9	CMB
Clee Hill Radar	52.3983	-2.5975	15.8	29.2	160.8	CMB
Debden Radar	51.9902	0.2638	101.2	187.4	276.5	CMB
Great Dun Fell Radar	54.6841	-2.4509	152.3	282.0	180.1	CMB
Bovingdon	51.7090	-0.5411	75.9	140.6	291.2	CMB
Pease Pottage Radar	51.0834	-0.2143	105.5	195.5	308.3	CMB
NERL Nav Aid Sites	Latitude	Longitude	Range(nm)	Range(km)	Azimuth(deg)	Туре
None						
NERL AGA Comms Sites	Latitude	Longitude	Range(nm)	Range(km)	Azimuth(deg)	Туре
None						

#### <u>Table 2 – Impacted Infrastructure</u>

#### **3.1.En-route radar technical assessment**

#### 3.1.1.Predicted impact on Clee Hill Radar

Using the theory as described in Appendix A and development specific propagation profile it has been determined that the terrain screening available will not adequately attenuate the signal, and therefore this development is likely to cause false primary plots to be generated.

A reduction in the radar's probability of detection, for real aircraft, is also anticipated.

#### 3.1.2.En-route operational assessment of radar impact

Where an assessment reveals a technical impact on a specific NATS radar, the users of that radar are consulted to ascertain whether the anticipated impact is acceptable to their operations or not.

Unit or role	Comment
Civil ATC	Acceptable
RDP Asset Management	Acceptable
London Military ATC	Acceptable

Note: The technical impact, as detailed above, has also been passed to non-NATS users of the affected radar, this may have included other planning consultees such as the MOD or other airports. Should these users consider the impact to be unacceptable it is expected that they will contact the planning authority directly to raise their concerns.

#### 3.2. En-route navigational aid assessment

#### 3.2.1.Predicted impact on navigation aids.

No impact is anticipated on NATS's navigation aids.

#### 3.3. En-route radio communication assessment

#### 3.3.1.Predicted impact on the radio communications infrastructure.

No impact is anticipated on NATS's radio communications infrastructure.

### 4. Conclusions

#### 4.1. En-route consultation

The proposed development has been examined by technical and operational safeguarding teams. A technical impact is anticipated, however this has been deemed to be acceptable.

### Appendix A – background radar theory

#### **Primary Radar False Plots**

When radar transmits a pulse of energy with a power of  $P_t$  the power density, P, at a range of r is given by the equation:

$$P = \frac{G_t P_t}{4\pi r^2}$$

Where  $G_t$  is the gain of the radar's antenna in the direction in question.

If an object at this point in space has a radar cross section of  $\sigma$ , this can be treated as if the object reradiates the pulse with a gain of  $\sigma$  and therefore the power density of the reflected signal at the radar is given by the equation:

$$P_a = \frac{\sigma P}{4\pi r^2} = \frac{\sigma G_t P_t}{(4\pi)^2 r^4}$$

The radar's ability to collect this power and feed it to its receiver is a function of its antenna's effective area,  $A_e$ , and is given by the equation:

$$P_r = P_a A_e = \frac{P_a G_r \lambda^2}{4\pi} = \frac{\sigma G_t G_r \lambda^2 P_t}{(4\pi)^3 r^4}$$

Where  $G_t$  is the Radar antenna's receive gain in the direction of the object and  $\lambda$  is the radar's wavelength.

In a real world environment this equation must be augmented to include losses due to a variety of factors both internal to the radar system as well as external losses due to terrain and atmospheric absorption.

For simplicity these losses are generally combined in a single variable L.

$$P_r = \frac{\sigma G_i G_r \lambda^2 P_i}{(4\pi)^3 r^4 L}$$

#### **Secondary Radar Reflections**

When modelling the impact on SSR the probability that an indirect signal reflected from a wind turbine has the signal strength to be confused for a real interrogation or reply can determined from a similar equation:

$$P_r = \frac{\sigma G_t G_r \lambda^2 P_t}{(4\pi)^3 r_t^2 r_r^2 L}$$

Where  $\mathbf{r}_t$  and  $\mathbf{r}_r$  are the range from radar-to-turbine and turbine-to-aircraft respectively. This equation can be rearranged to give the radius from the turbine within which an aircraft must be for reflections to become a problem.

$$r_r = \sqrt{\frac{\lambda^2}{(4\pi)^3}} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma G_t G_r P_t}{r_t^2 P_r L}}$$

#### Shadowing

When turbines lie directly between a radar and an aircraft not only do they have the potential to absorb or deflect, enough power such that the signal is of insufficient level to be detected on arrival. It is also possible that azimuth determination, whether this done via sliding window or monopulse, can be distorted giving rise to inaccurate position reporting.

#### **Terrain and Propagation Modelling**

All terrain and propagation modelling is carried out by a software tool called ICS Telecom (version 11.1.7). All calculations of propagation losses are carried out with ICS Telecom configured to use the ITU-R 526 propagation model.

## Appendix B – Diagrams



